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From Chaos to Contractarianism:
Hobbes, Pojman, and the Case for World Government
Abstract. In this paper, I argue that Louis Pojman fails to justify his conception of a
moderate cosmopolitan world government. I illustrate this by highlighting the fact that Pojman
fails to articulate adequate justifications for his Principle of Humanity (POH) and Principle of
Equality (POE). This is problematic because the POH and POE ground his conception of
human rights, which, in turn, grounds his conception of a moderate cosmopolitan world
government. Hence, since he fails to justify the POH and the POE, I conclude that his
conception of a cosmopolitan world government ultimately fails. But, before I launch this
attack on Pojman, I offer substantial philosophical analyses of Hobbes’s arguments for the
state of nature, human rights, and the establishment of the commonwealth. I do so because
Hobbes provides the philosophical basis for Pojman’s philosophy of world government. I
show that by understanding the philosophical problems inherent in Hobbes we gain better
understanding of the philosophical problems at the basis of Pojman.
I. Introduction.
Osama bin Laden and his followers are not an isolated cult…. [Rather] they come out of a
culture that reinforces their hostility, distrust, and hatred of the West--and America in
particular…. Just read the Arab press in the aftermath of the [9/11] attacks and you will detect
a not-so-hidden admiration for bin Laden. [For example,] one Pakistani newspaper [wrote:]
‘September 11th was not mindless terrorism for terrorism’s sake. [Rather,] it was reaction and
revenge, even retribution.’ [The problem here] is not that Osama bin Laden believes that this
is a religious war… but that millions of people agree with him.1
I suspect that Fareed Zakaria’s report about the beliefs of millions of people in the Islamic world is
accurate, at least, in part; but, he would have done much better to also point out that many people across
the Western world readily share their leaders’ suspicions and distrust of those in the Middle East. As a
result, they unquestionably acquiesce with their leaders’ international policies regarding the Middle East,
even when those policies entail going to war. For example, in the 2002 State of the Union Address,
President George W. Bush described Iraq as an immediate threat to the interests and security of the
United States.2 Later, in the National Security Strategy for the United State of America, the Bush
Administration reported that there was “irrefutable proof” that Iraq was developing “nuclear weapons.”3
The President reiterated this in several of his speeches after the publication of the report. He then




therefore, America would pursue a strategy of preemptive war.  Since many in Congress unquestionably
accepted the Administration’s suspicions about Iraq they readily acquiesced with its doctrine of
preemptive war. They therefore authorized the use of military force prior to determining whether or not
Iraq was in fact a threat to the United States.5
Of course, this problem is not unique to the United States. All too often those in power describe
their enemies as threats to the interests and/or security of the state and then argue that their enemies
need to be dealt with immediately. The result is almost always violence, bloodshed, terrorism,
human rights violations, and war. Add to this, the fact that there has always been suspicion, distrust,
terrorism, human rights violations, and war between competing nation-states and it becomes clear
that we have always existed in a Hobbesian state of nature. Or, at least, this is what Louis Pojman
would have us believe in Terrorism, Human Rights, and the Case for World Government.6
Fortunately, Pojman’s dire conception of contemporary international relations does not entail that
all is lost. In fact, in Terrorism, Human Rights, and the Case for World Government, he offers us a
way out of the chaos of the state of nature. First, he argues that, in order to end human rights
abuses, we must use the mechanisms of government to punish those responsible for the abuses.7
Secondly, he argues that we must use the mechanisms of government to bring an end to the regimes
and organizations that sponsor terrorism and harbor terrorists.8 Third, he argues that any adequate
solution to the chaos of the state of nature will require us to construct a world government that has
the power and jurisdiction to defend human rights globally.9 Lastly, according to Pojman, such a
government must be moderate, cosmopolitan, and ultimately grounded in human rights.
While I think cosmopolitanism is philosophically defensible, here, I argue that Louis Pojman fails
to adequately defend his conception of it. I illustrate this by highlighting the fact that Pojman fails
to articulate adequate philosophical justifications for his Principle of Humanity (POH) and Principle
of Equality (POE). This is problematic because the POH and POE ground his conception of human
rights, which, in turn, grounds his conception of a moderate cosmopolitan world government.
Hence, given that Pojman fails to articulate adequate philosophical justifications for the POH and
the POE, his conception of a moderate cosmopolitan world government fails. This is one reason
why I reject it. But, before I launch this attack on Pojman, I offer substantial philosophical analyses
of Hobbes’s arguments for the state of nature, human rights, and the establishment of the
commonwealth. I do so because Hobbes’s political philosophy provides the basis for Pojman’s
cosmopolitan world government. Here, my contention is that by understanding the philosophical
problems inherent in Hobbes’s political philosophy we gain a better understanding of the
philosophical problems inherent in Pojman’s theory of world government.10 In the end, this
understanding of the problems inherent in Pojman serves as my basis for rejecting the philosophical
grounding for his conception of world government, and, it serves as my basis for suggesting
alternative ways he might seek to ground his conception of a moderate cosmopolitan world
government.
II. Thomas Hobbes and the Philosophy of Human Rights.11
In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes argues that humans are naturally rational, self-regarding beings who
continually seek to fulfill their desires.12 As Hobbes explains it, in the state of nature, humans exist
under conditions in which there are limited resources and no central authority to keep the peace or
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to direct the wills of each to the common good of all.13 Therefore, humans naturally desire more
and more power because they cannot “assure the power and means to live well… without the
acquisition of more.”14 Consequently, if two or more humans desire some thing that they cannot all
have then they become enemies, each wanting to destroy the other in order to obtain his/her end and
thereby increase his/her chances of surviving in the state of nature.15 Of course, for Hobbes, such
conflicts inevitably lead to the war of each against all in which nothing is off limits, and everything
is useful for the purpose of self-preservation.16 For these reasons, Hobbes argues that life in the
state of nature is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”17 Under such conditions, he tells us that
all have the “liberty to use their power according to their wills for the purpose of self-preservation
and of doing anything that they judge to be the aptest means thereunto.”18 This is the most
fundamental human right in Hobbes’s state of nature. However, in order to fully understand what it
entails, we must explicate some of Hobbes’s terminology, particularly his terms power, will, and
liberty.
By power, Hobbes means one’s abilities to obtain one’s ends.19 One’s abilities to obtain one’s ends
consist in one’s natural and instrumental powers. More specifically, one’s natural powers consist
in the faculties of one’s mind and body. Here, Hobbes has a two-fold conception of natural powers.
In part, natural powers consist in the faculties of the mind, such as the intellect, and, in part,
natural powers consist in the faculties of the body, such as strength.20 Hobbes’s basic idea is that
humans use the faculties of their minds and bodies, or natural powers, in order to obtain their ends.
For example, one might use one’s intellect and/or strength in order to convince others to accept
one’s position. Either way, such a use of one’s intellect and/or strength constitutes a use of the
natural powers of one’s body.
Instrumental powers, however, consist of means that are external to the body, such as riches,
money, reputation, and friends.21 Not surprisingly, Hobbes also has a two-fold conception of
instrumental powers. In part, instrumental powers consist of assets such as riches, and, in part,
instrumental powers consist of associations such as friendships.22 Such assets and associations are
obtained through the faculties of one’s mind, body, and/or, although Hobbes does not say this
explicitly, good fortune. For example, one might use one’s intellect and/or strength in order to
acquire money. Alternatively, one might acquire instrumental power through good fortune, luck, or,
to use Hobbes’s terminology, “the secret working of God.”23 Either way, here, Hobbes’s basic idea
is that humans use their instrumental powers to achieve their ends.
By will, Hobbes means the last appetite and/or aversion in deliberating immediately before seeking
to obtain an end, to avoid an end, or to refrain from acting.24 He writes:
the definition of the will, given commonly by the Schools, that it is a rational appetite, is
not good. For if it were, then could there be no voluntary act against reason. For a
voluntary act is that, which proceedth from the will, and no other. But if instead of a
rational appetite, we say an appetite resulting from a precedent deliberation, the
definition is the same that I have given it here, [namely,] …the last appetite in
deliberating.25
Of course, by deliberating, he means reasoning between competing ways of acting.26 Deliberation,
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he tells us, encompasses “the whole sum of [competing] desires, aversions, hopes, and fears.”27 He
writes: “though we say in common discourse that a man had a will once to do a thing that
nevertheless he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an inclination… because the action [or
inaction] depends not of it, but of the last inclination.”28 Consequently, for Hobbes, while we yet
deliberate between alternative ways of acting we simply have inclinations to act in this or that way.
However, once we settle the matter we express our wills to act in one or another way. Hence, for
Hobbes, willing brings our deliberations to a close.29
Reasoning, according to Hobbes, consists in “adding or subtracting… the consequences of general
names.”30 He writes: “geometricians teach [the addition and subtraction of] in lines, figures, solids,
and superficial angles;” “logicians teach the same in the consequence of words;” politicians “add
[and subtract] pactions to find men’s duties;” and, lawyers add and subtract “the law and facts to
find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men.”31 Hence, reasoning permeates the whole
of human endeavors. What’s important to note, however, is that in practical matters we reason
strategically between competing appetites and aversions so as to achieve our own ends.32
Appetites and aversions, Hobbes tells us, are motions towards and/or away from ends.33 By
motions, he means movements within or of bodies; or, in this case, he means movements within or
of the human body. When the movements are within the human body Hobbes calls them
endeavors.34 He writes:
although unstudied men do not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing
moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in is, for the shortness of it, insensible; yet
that doth not hinder, but that such motions are. For let a space be never so little, that
which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be moved
over that. These small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear
in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called
ENDEAVOUR.35
“This endeavour, when it is towards something which causes it, is called APPETITE,” but when it
“is fromward something, it is generally called AVERSION.”36 Therefore, both appetites and
aversions “signify… motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring.”37
Although Hobbes does not say this explicitly, there are five kinds of human bodily motions,
namely: (1) internal, vital involuntary motions, (2) internal, animal voluntary motions1, (3)
internal, animal voluntary motions2, (4) external, animal voluntary motions, and (5) various
combinations of internal1 and 2 and external, vital and animal, involuntary and voluntary motions.38
Movements within the body such as the beating of the heart, the expanding and contracting of the
lungs, and the circulation of the blood are internal, vital involuntary motions.39 Alternatively,
movements within the body such as appetites and aversions are internal, animal voluntary
motions1.40 Similarly, movements within the body such as thinking, judging, deliberating,
reasoning, and so on, are internal, animal voluntary motions2.41 And, of course, movements such as
walking, running, speaking, and so on, are external, animal voluntary motions.42
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The primary difference between internal, vital involuntary motions and internal, animal voluntary
motions1 and 2 is that internal, vital involuntary motions are involuntary and they never direct one
towards ends or away from unwanted consequences. By contrast, internal, animal voluntary
motions1 and 2 are voluntary and they always direct one towards one’s ends or away from unwanted
consequences. Nevertheless, there is another important difference to consider, namely that between
internal, animal voluntary motions1 and internal, animal voluntary motions2. The difference is
simply this: whereas internal, animal voluntary motions1 represent one’s appetites and aversions,
internal, animal voluntary motions2 represent one’s thoughts, deliberations, judgments, and so on,
about one’s appetites and aversions.
Here, Hobbes has a two-tier ordering of internal, animal voluntary motions: on the first level,
humans have appetites towards ends and/or aversions away from unwanted consequences; and, on
the second level, humans deliberate and make judgments about their appetites and aversions.43
Together, internal, animal voluntary motions1 and 2 provide the ground for external, animal
voluntary motions such as speaking, walking, running, and so on. Or, as Hobbes explains it, “when
in the mind of man, appetites and aversion… arise alternatively… the whole sum of desires…
continues till the thing be either… thought” possible or impossible.44 He continues: “because going,
speaking, and the like voluntary motions, depends always upon a precedent thought… it is evident,
that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary actions.”45 What Hobbes fails to
mention here is that internal, animal voluntary motions1 and 2 and external, animal voluntary
motions always depend on internal, vital involuntary motions simply because if one’s internal, vital
involuntary motions fail then one would not be able to desire, think, or act, at least, not for very
long.
Hobbes also fails to mention that all external motions consist of a combination of internal and
external, vital and animal, involuntary and voluntary motions. For example, walking consist of
internal, vital involuntary motions because one’s heart must be functioning in order for one to walk;
internal, animal voluntary motions1 because one must have had appetites towards walking and
aversions away from walking; internal, animal voluntary motions2 because one must make the
decision to walk; and, external, animal voluntary motions because one must be able to physically
move in order to walk. Hence, although Hobbes often distinguishes between internal and external
motions, particularly with respect to power and liberty, there is a continuum of movement from
internal, animal voluntary motions1 to internal, animal voluntary motions2 to external, animal
voluntary motions, all of which depend on internal, vital involuntary motions.46 This is illustrated,
in part, by his contention that the imagination is the beginning of all voluntary motions.
More importantly, however, according to Hobbes, humans are at liberty, that is, free, whenever
their external, animal voluntary motions are not impeded. He writes: “LIBERTY, or FREEDOM,
signifieth, properly, the absence of opposition.”47 Of course, by opposition to motion, he means any
physical barrier to one’s external, animal voluntary motions.48 This means, of course, that
whenever one’s external, animal voluntary motions are impeded one is not free or at liberty to
achieve one’s ends. Hobbes writes:
whatsoever is so tied, or environed, as it cannot move but within a certain space, which
space is determined by the opposition of some external body, we say it hath not liberty
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to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilst they are imprisoned, or restrained,
with walls or chains; and of the water whilst it is kept in by banks, or vessels, that
otherwise would spread itself into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at liberty to
move in such manner as without those external impediments they would.49
What is equally important to notice here is that whenever one’s internal, vital or voluntary motions1
and 2 are not impeded one has power. Hence, one might be imprisoned, restrained, chained, or, in
short, without liberty, but nevertheless have power, that is, unobstructed internal, vital or voluntary
motions1 and 2.50 Conversely, whenever one’s internal, vital or voluntary motions1 and 2 are
impeded one lacks power. Hobbes writes: “when the impediment of motion, is in the constitution of
the thing itself, we use not to say; it wants the liberty; but the power to move as when a stone lieth
still, or a man is fastened to his bed by sickness.”51 Here, by impediment of motion, he means any
internal obstruction to one’s internal, vital or voluntary motions1 and 2.
At this juncture, it is necessary to address a philosophical problem that may have gone unnoticed.
In chapter ten of Leviathan, Hobbes defines powers as one’s natural abilities and instrumental
means to obtain one’s ends.52 His examples of natural powers include strength and intelligence, and
his examples of instrumental powers include friendship and associations. Simply put, the problem is
that the conception of powers that Hobbes articulates in chapter ten of Leviathan is inconsistent
with the internal power/external liberty distinction that he articulates in the twenty-first chapter of
Leviathan. For example, in chapter ten of Leviathan, Hobbes tells us that the ability to use one’s
friends in order to obtain one’s ends constitutes an instrumental power.53 However, since one’s
friends are external to one’s body the ability to use one’s friends represents an external instrumental
power. But, in chapter twenty-one of Leviathan, Hobbes articulates his internal power/external
liberty distinction. According to this distinction, powers are internal and liberties are external.
Hence, Hobbes’s concept of external instrumental power is inconsistent with his internal
power/external liberty distinction because it entails that some powers are external.
Even worse, in chapter twenty-one of Leviathan, Hobbes defines power as the absence of internal
impediments to one’s internal motions.54 This introduces an altogether new conception of power.
For, whereas power in chapter ten of Leviathan refers to one’s natural abilities and instrumental
means to obtain one’s ends, power in chapter twenty-one of Leviathan refers to the absence of
internal impediments to internal motions. The former conception of power is positive while the
latter conception of power is negative. Hence, here, Hobbes is oscillating between fundamentally
different conceptions of power.
As a way of reconciling Hobbes’s inconsistent conceptions of power, we might think of Hobbesian
power as the absence of internal impediments to internal motions. But, of course, this attempt at
reconciliation fails because it does not encompass the external instrumental power that Hobbes
discusses in chapter ten of Leviathan. Moreover, it is negative, and therefore, it fails to encompass
the positive conception of power that Hobbes articulates in chapter ten of Leviathan. Alternatively,
we might think of Hobbesian power as the absence of internal and/or external impediments to one’s
natural abilities and/or instrumental means to obtain one’s ends. Although this alternative
conception of power encompasses internal natural power and external instrumental power it
nevertheless fails because it violates the internal power/external liberty distinction that Hobbes
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articulates in chapter twenty-one of Leviathan. In addition, it fails because it does not encompass
the positive conception of power that he articulates in chapter ten of Leviathan.
Nevertheless, there might still be a way to reconcile Hobbes’s inconsistent conceptions of power. In
order to do so, we will have to alter his conception of power in chapter ten of Leviathan. This
alteration requires us to remove Hobbes’s external instrumental conception of power from the
category of powers and place it into the category of liberties. In this way, we can interpret
Hobbesian power in terms that parallel Hobbesian liberty, that is, as the absence of internal
impediments to internal motions, without violating his internal power/external liberty distinction. In
addition, we will have to add a positive conception of liberty in order to make liberty consistent
with this new conception of power. In this way, we can interpret Hobbesian liberty in terms that
parallel Hobbesian power. Now, Hobbesian liberty refers to the absence of external impediments to
one’s external motions and Hobbesian power refers to the absence of internal impediments to one’s
internal motions. On a prima facie level, this way of thinking about Hobbes’s conceptions of liberty
and power works.
Unfortunately, however, there is a problem with this new conception of Hobbesian liberty; namely,
it does not fit neatly into Hobbes’s conception of external, animal voluntary motions. For, external
instrumental liberty consists of means that are external to the body, such as friends and associates,
while external, animal voluntary motions consist in one’s abilities to act externally, such as
walking. The former refers to liberty that is external to or separate from the body while the later
refers to bodily motion that is expressed externally. Here, it is not altogether clear that external
instrumental liberty could be made to fit neatly into Hobbes’s conception of external, animal
voluntary motions. At this point, there seems to be no way to completely reconcile Hobbes’s
conceptions of liberty and power. For this reason, I conclude that they are irreconcilably
inconsistent. Notwithstanding this problem, however, my reformulations of Hobbes’s conceptions
of power and liberty seem to be the most charitable reading of Hobbes. Therefore, I shall henceforth
rely on them in order to interpret Hobbes’s conception of the fundamental nature of human rights.
We are now in a position to determine what Hobbes’s conception of the fundamental nature of
human rights entails. Since Hobbes defines a human right as one’s liberty to use one’s power as one
wills for the preservation of one’s life,55 and since I have reformulated Hobbes’s conceptions of
liberty and power in terms that parallel one another, to say that one has Hobbesian human rights
means that one is not constrained to such a degree that one lacks sufficient liberty and power to act
according to one’s will for the purpose of preserving one’s life. Or, to put it in a manner that is
consonant with my above discussion of Hobbesian motions, to say that one has human rights means
that one’s internal, vital involuntary motions, internal, animal voluntary motions1 and 2, and
external, animal voluntary motions are not obstructed in such a way that prevents one from
achieving one’s ends.
Conversely, to say that one lacks Hobbesian human rights means that one is restrained in such a
way that one does not have a sufficient amount of liberty and/or power to act according to one’s
will for the purpose of preserving one’s life. Or, to put it in a manner that is consonant with my
above discussion of Hobbesian motions, to say that one lacks Hobbesian human rights means that
one’s internal, vital involuntary motions, internal, animal voluntary motions1 and 2, and/or external,
animal voluntary motions are constrained in such a way that prevents one from achieving one’s
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ends. This is the case with Hobbes’s infirm.56
III. From Chaos to Contractarianism: Constructing the Commonwealth.
The fact that Hobbesian human rights exist independently of civil society does not entail that they
are unrelated to civil society. On the contrary, Hobbes tells us that the transfer of human rights to a
sovereign who has a monopoly on the coercive use of force marks the transition from the state of
nature into civil society.57 Whenever this transfer results in a contractual agreement between those
who will be subject to it, it establishes government by institution.58 More importantly, however,
whenever humans contract to be governed by a central authority that has a monopoly on the
coercive use of force they incur duties to that authority, and to one another.59 In order to see this
clearly, it is necessary for us to examine Hobbes’s argument for the establishment of the
commonwealth.
As Hobbes would have it, a contract is a mutual exchange of rights, or, in this case, it is a mutual
exchange of human rights.60 More importantly, however, according to Hobbes, whenever humans
transfer their human rights they “intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person” or persons.61
In which case, they divest themselves of the rights “of hindering [others] to the benefit of [their]
rights to the same.”62 Consequently, they incur obligations to refrain from interfering with the
rights of those who will benefit from the exchange. Otherwise, they commit an injustice. That is,
they contradict their initial intentions in transferring their human rights. Hobbes writes:
when a man hath… abandoned, or granted away his right; then he is said to be obliged,
or bound, not to hinder those, to whom such a right is granted, or abandoned, from the
benefit of it: and that he ought, and it is his DUTY, not to make void that voluntary act
of his own: and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being sine jure; the
right being renounced, or transferred.63
But, of course, for Hobbes, the transfer of human rights alone is not sufficient to establish civil
society. For, on one hand, he tells us that “the laws… [of] justice… without the terror of some
power to cause them to be observed are contrary to [the] passions that carry us to partiality, pride,
revenge, and the like.”64 This, on the other hand, is compounded by the facts that, in the state of
nature, humans reason strategically, self-interestedly, and they have rights to everything.65 Hence,
“every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art… against all other men.”66
Hence, under the conditions of the state of nature, “there can be no security to any man, how strong
or wise soever he be.”67 For, the scarcity of resources and absence of a central coercive authority
“inclineth [humans] to contention, enmity, and war, [simply] because the way of one competitor to
the attaining of his desire is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other.”68 And, of course, the
victor “is in the like danger of succumbing to another.”69
For Hobbes, the only way out of this misery is for each to agree with all to transfer their human
rights to a sovereign who possess enough force to direct their individual wills to the will of all.70
This, Hobbes tells us,
is more than consent, or concord; it is real unity of them all, in one and the same person,
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made by covenant of every man with every man, in such a manner, as if every man
should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this
man, or to this assembly of man on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him,
and authorize all his actions in like manner.71
In this way, humans move from chaos to commonwealth.
IV. Practical and Philosophical Problems in Thomas Hobbes.
In addition to the aforementioned philosophical problem in Hobbes72 there are practical problems
that deserve attention, particularly those inherent in his argument for the establishment of the
commonwealth. The first of which is this: since there are no shared human rights practices in the
state of nature through which humans transfer human rights and incur duties Hobbesian human
rights are meaningless in the state of nature, which, in turn, makes the transfer of human rights for
the establishment of the commonwealth practically impossible.73 Here, notice that I have said that
the transfer of human rights for the establishment of the commonwealth is practically impossible. I
say this because the denial of the claim that humans can transfer their human rights for the
establishment of the commonwealth does not result in a contradiction. Hence, it is logically
possible for humans to transfer their human rights. So, while I admit that it is logically or
philosophically possible for humans to transfer their human rights in the state of nature in order to
establish a commonwealth, as we shall see below, it is nevertheless practically impossible for them
to do so, on a Hobbesian model.
We can imagine a scenario between humans in the state of nature in order to illustrate this. But,
before I do so, recall that, according to Hobbes, in the state of nature, “there is no place for
industry… no culture of the earth; no navigation, no use of the commodities that may be imported
by sea; no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing… no knowledge of the
earth… no arts; no letters; no society;” but only that “to be every man’s that he can get: and for so
long, as he can keep it.”74 Now, imagine that a multitude of Hobbesians have gathered together in
the state of nature and that one of them utters the words: I hereby transfer my right of governing
myself to this man insofar as each of you are willing to do likewise. Notice that, since there are no
shared practices in the state of nature through which humans transfer human rights and incur duties,
the speaker’s utterances would be completely meaningless to those who hear them.75 Even worse,
given that the conditions of the state of nature require each to act in hostile ways towards all--
otherwise, according to Hobbes, they would make themselves prey for others76--those who hear the
speaker’s utterances would simply respond in the hostile ways required by the conditions of the
state of nature.
So, even if we assume that the listeners can understand the speaker’s utterances, since the conditions
of the state of nature require them to act with hostility towards one another, and, even more, since
“force and fraud are the two cardinal virtues” in the state of nature,77 the listeners would have no
reason to trust the speaker.78 In fact, they would be extremely skeptical of him, thinking that he
intends to trick them into surrendering their human rights so that he can subdue, conquer, and use
them as he sees fit. Hence, even if we assume that the listeners can understand the speaker’s
utterances, the conditions of Hobbes’s state of nature are such that they make the transfer of rights
for the establishment of the commonwealth practically impossible.
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Hobbes might attempt to avoid this objection by arguing that humans simply perform certain
actions that result in the transfer of their human rights. In which case, no shared human rights
practices are necessary in order for humans to transfer human rights and incur duties. But, of
course, this response fails because it is susceptible to an objection that is similar to the one that I
have already articulated above. For example, again, imagine that a multitude of Hobbesians have
gathered together and that one of them performs certain actions through which he/she intends to
transfer his/her human rights. Since there are no shared human rights practices, or, rather,
performances, in the state of nature through which humans transfer human rights and incur duties,
the actor’s performance would be completely meaningless to those who witness it. Even worse,
given that the conditions of the state of nature require each to act in hostile ways towards all, and,
even more, given that “force and fraud are the two cardinal virtues” in the state of nature,79 those
who witness the actor’s performance would simply respond in the hostile ways required by the
conditions of the state of nature. Otherwise, they would make themselves prey for others.80
Of course, here, I do not deny that mentally and physically healthy humans would, in fact, possess
Hobbesian internal, vital involuntary motions, internal, animal voluntary motions1 and 2, and
external, animal voluntary motions. Rather, I deny that, in the absence of shared human rights
practices, they could understand their bodily motions as human rights or know what it is to possess
human rights, transfer human rights, and incur duties. After all, such notions only make sense
against the backdrop of shared human rights practices. I readily admit that such practices may be
legal, moral, religious, and/or social. I also readily admit that such practices tell us what human
rights are, under what conditions one may transfer one’s human rights, how one transfers one’s
human rights, and what one’s duties are. Notice, however, that after granting all of this, it follows a
fortiori that, in the absence of shared human rights practices, humans could no more transfer human
rights and incur duties than could, to use Hobbes’s terminology, lions, bears, and wolves.81 For this
reason, I conclude that Hobbes’s conception of the state of nature makes the transfer of human
rights for the establishment of the commonwealth practically impossible.
What is worse is that Hobbes’s argument for the transfer of rights presupposes that shared human
rights practices exist in the state of nature.82 Here, I say that Hobbes’s presupposition is worse than
the above problem because it entails that his argument for the transfer of human rights is
straightforwardly inconsistent with his conception of the state of nature. On one hand, he argues
that culture, society, and the like “relate to men in society, not in solitude.”83 Yet, on the other
hand, his argument for the transfer of human rights relies upon shared cultural and social practices.
For example, Hobbes tells us that “a right is laid aside, either by simply renouncing it; or by
transferring it to another.”84 He continues: “the way by which a man… transferreth his rights, is a
declaration, or signification, by some voluntary and sufficient sign, or signs… And these signs are
either words only or actions only; or as it happeneth most often, both words, and actions.”85
Moreover, “when a man hath in either manner abandon, or granted away his right; then he is…
obliged or bound not to make void that voluntary act of his own.”86 That is, he becomes obligated
“to standeth out of [the way of others], that [they] may enjoy [their] original rights, without
hindrance from him.”87 “For,” he continues, “it is an absurdity to contradict” or to “undo that,
which from the beginning he had voluntarily done.”88
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Here, one ought to wonder how Hobbes reaches the conclusions that one transfers human rights
through declarations or significations and that whenever one transfers human rights one incurs
duties to refrain from interfering with the human rights of those who will benefit from the transfer,
if the state of nature is, in fact, without culture and society. After all, transferring human rights
through declarations and significations and incurring duties as a result of such transfers are
cultural/social conventions or practices. Even more, all cultural/social conventions and practices are
shared by at least two people.89 This, of course, illuminates the fact that Hobbes’s argument for the
transfer of human rights presupposes that human rights practices exist in the state of nature even
though he argues that the state of nature is without culture and society. For this reason, I conclude
that Hobbes’s argument for the transfer of rights is straightforwardly inconsistent with his
conception of the state of nature. I shall return to this point later when I offer a final analysis of
Pojman’s position. For now, suffice it to say that Hobbes’s arguments for the transfer of human
rights and the establishment of the commonwealth are philosophically and practically problematic.
V. From Chaos to Contractarianism: Pojman’s Cosmopolitan World Government.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned philosophical and practical problems, many contemporary
theorists argue that Thomas Hobbes is the one political philosopher who correctly identified the
proper international relations between nation-states.90 Louis Pojman is one such theorist. To be
sure, in Terrorism, Human Rights, and the Case for World Government, he argues that
contemporary nation-states exist in a Hobbesian state of nature.91 To illustrate this, he points to the
fact there has always been violence between competing nation-states and that such violence has
accounted for billions of deaths, injuries, and displacements.
What is worse is that some of those responsible for the deaths, injuries, and displacements have
been praised by the international community.92 For example, Yasser Arafat received a Nobel Peace
Prize, numerous speaking invitations from several of the world’s most prestigious colleges and
universities, and was buried a hero. Moreover, many “terrorist leaders have frankly admitted that
they owe their… success to terrorism.”93 For example, George Habash, a recognized leader of a
notorious terrorist organization, boasted that “‘when [his group] hijacks a plane it has [a greater]
effect than it would [had they] killed a hundred Israelis in battle.’”94
Add to this, the fact that, in many ways, global systems of transportation make it easier for
terrorists to travel and transport materials and it becomes clear that we should expect further
terrorist attacks. Think about it in this way: Pojman tells us that “there are about 175 million
immigrants in the world and another 150 million migrants” traveling between various nations
everyday.95 New, efficient, and inexpensive means of transportation makes inter-continental travel
easier, and therefore, they serve as convenient ways of bringing people closer together.96
Unfortunately, however, one effect of making transportation easier and bringing people closer
together is that we also make it easier for terrorists to travel and transport dangerous materials. This
became apparent to Homeland Security after they learned that the nineteen 9/11 hijackers entered
the United States through conventional means.
Not to worry, however, Pojman promises us a solution to the problems of the state of nature. First,




make no concessions and seek to punish those responsible for terrorism in our judicial systems.
This, he tells us, is no more than justice requires.98 Secondly, he argues that we must actively seek
to bring an end to the “regimes and organizations that sponsor and promote terrorism.”99 Here, he
has in mind organizations like “the Taliban, al Qaeda, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.”100 He continues:
bringing an end to such organizations will require us to create an international executive responsible
for enforcing international law.101 Third, he argues that we must build an international government
that is strong enough to promote and defend human rights globally.102 This will require us to
develop a world government grounded in human rights.103 Such a government, Pojman tells us,
must be moderate and cosmopolitan.
Notice how Hobbesian Pojman’s solutions to the chaos of the state of nature are. In short, he argues
for a social contract that establishes a world government that is strong enough to stabilize the
international community but that is not so brazen it would arbitrarily infringe upon the liberty of
existing nations. Pojman invites us to think of such a government in terms that parallels our own.
For example, the federal government of the United States has the power and jurisdiction to enforce
federal laws universally, but, it nevertheless grants the local governments of the fifty states enough
liberty to determine what happens within their borders as long as they do not violate federal
laws.104
According to Pojman, a similar relationship can be developed between an international government
and the governments of existing nations-states. He refers to this kind of relationship as a moderate
cosmopolitan world government.105 As Pojman describes it, such a world government would be
moderate because it would maintain respect for the liberty of existing nations-states, and, it would
be cosmopolitan because it would elevate the citizens of all nations-states to the status of world
citizens, thereby granting them human rights that supersede the laws of their homelands.
VI. The Political and Practical Appeals of Pojman’s Cosmopolitan World Government.
Pojman’s proposal is appealing in three respects. First, it is politically appealing because it has the
potential to move us further towards satisfying many of our hitherto unfulfilled humanitarian
commitments. For example, some international human rights covenants commit us to providing
international human rights protections for all. Unfortunately, however, as Pojman rightly points out,
we have utterly failed to live up to those commitments. One reason for this is that international
human rights laws lack teeth. In fact, this explains why the leaders of so many nations have violated
international human rights laws with impunity.106 This is both morally and legally unacceptable. In
this, Pojman and I agree.
Secondly, Pojman’s proposal is politically appealing because it has the potential to rein in and place
humanitarian and environmental limitations on our multi-national corporations, thereby introducing
a higher level of corporate responsibility and accountability onto our international markets. For
example, consider the case of the American oil company Unocal. In short, the Unocal Corporation,
Total S.A., a French oil company, and the Burmese government agreed to enter into a joint venture
to construct an oil pipeline. In the course of constructing the pipeline the Burmese government used
its military to gather workers and provide protection for the pipeline. Unfortunately, the Burmese
military achieved these goals by forcing hundreds of its citizens to work on the pipeline project
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without compensation, by forcefully relocating those who lived on the land where the pipeline was
being constructed, and by raping, torturing, assaulting, and murdering those who attempted to
resist.107 Not only did Unocal and Total S.A. have ample information that suggested such abuses
would occur, but, when they found out that human rights abuses were in fact occurring they
continued to conduct business with the Burmese government. Furthermore, when they were pressed
to disclose what they knew about the abuses they attempted to conceal their knowledge of it. By
conducting business with the Burmese government and attempting to conceal information about the
abuses Unocal and Total S.A. violated numerous U.S. laws, French laws, and international laws.
What is worrisome, however, is that no one has ever been criminally prosecuted for the abuses.
Unfortunately, there are many companies like Unocal and Total S.A. operating on our international
markets. This is morally and legally unacceptable. In this, Pojman and I are also in agreement.
Third, Pojman’s proposal is practically appealing because it is nuanced in such a way that it avoids,
on one hand, the extreme of idealistic cosmopolitanism, and, on the other hand, the extreme of
staunch nationalism. In fact, I refrain from giving overdue attention to the standard practical
objections to cosmopolitanism precisely because Pojman can avoid them. For example, in For Love
of Country, Sissela Bok argues that cosmopolitanism fails to take seriously the conflicts that we
often experience as a result of our close knit ties to our kinsmen. She continues: many of these
relations give rise to kinship commitments that we hold above our commitments to our fellow
cosmopolitans.108 Notice, however, that Bok’s close knit ties objection no more undermines
Pojman’s moderate cosmopolitanism than it would undermine nationalism if she had argued that
humans sometimes have conflicting commitments between, say, their kinsmen and their country.
Here, Pojman could easily admit that humans sometimes have conflicting commitments that require
adjudication. Nevertheless, as long as human rights violations are not at issue, choosing one’s
kinsmen over one’s cosmopolitan commitments, or vice versa, is not a problem. After all, a
moderate conception of cosmopolitan world government like Pojman’s allows people to have both
familial (domestic) and cosmopolitan (international) commitments. Hence, while Bok’s objection
might show that idealistic cosmopolitanism and staunch nationalism are practically problematic, it
fails to show that Pojman’s moderate cosmopolitanism is practically problematic.
Similarly, in For Love of Country, Benjamin Barber argues that cosmopolitanism misses the
humanizing function of national political and legal institutions. He concludes that it therefore
ignores the humanizing function of national institutions.109 However, again, as long as human rights
violations are not at issue, a moderate conception of cosmopolitan world government like Pojman’s
allows nation-states to maintain their internal sovereignty. Therefore, national institutions will
continue to exist and function as they always have. Hence, Pojman can easily avoid Barber’s
objection by simply admitting that national institutions will continue to humanize people. Of
course, Barber’s objection is not problematic for Pojman because his conception of
cosmopolitanism is moderate and therefore not exclusive of nationalism.
By now, it should be evident that such objections are designed to undermine a staunch conception
of cosmopolitan world government, which, of course, is exclusive of nationalism. Martha
Nussbaum articulates such a conception of cosmopolitan world government in For Love of Country.
By contrast, Louis Pojman articulates a moderate conception of cosmopolitan world government
that is compatible with kinship and national commitments. So, suffice it to say that the standard
objections such as those articulated by Bok and Barber fail to undermine Pojman’s moderate
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cosmopolitan world government. For this reason, it is best that I move on to consider some
philosophical problems with Pojman’s justification for his conception of a moderate cosmopolitan
world government.
VII. Philosophical Problems with Pojman’s Cosmopolitan World Government.
What I find philosophically objectionable about Pojman’s arguments is that they are woefully
underdeveloped, which, in turn, leaves his conception of a cosmopolitan world government
unjustified. For example, Pojman grounds his conception of world government on two principles:
the Principle of Humanity (POH) and the Principle of Equality (POE). But, in the course of arguing
for the Principle of Humanity (POH), he fails to articulate an adequate philosophical justification
for his principle. Rather, he simply asserts that the POH is justified by our common human nature,
and that justice requires us to act in accordance with it. He writes: “the philosophical justification
for the Principle of Humanity is rooted in our common human nature. We are all roughly similar in
native abilities to reason, [to] suffer,” and therefore, “we can interact rationally with one
another.”110 Of course, these strong metaphysical claims cannot be accepted without philosophical
justifications, particularly since they are supposed to ground Pojman’s conception of human rights
and philosophers like Richard Rorty and Michael Ignatieff have argued against similar attempts to
ground human rights by others.111 Hence, short of articulating adequate philosophical justifications
for his claims, Pojman leaves the POH ungrounded. This is problematic because, in part, the POH
grounds his conception of human rights, which, in turn, grounds his conception of world
government.
Pojman makes a similar mistake when he attempts to justify the POE. Instead of articulating an
adequate philosophical justification for the POE, he simply asserts that “we generally believe that it
is unjust for someone to have fewer opportunities to develop their lives,” and therefore, “justice
requires [that we] attempt to provide each person with equal opportunity to live a worthwhile
life.”112 Again, here, Pojman’s claims require adequate philosophical justifications, particularly
since they are straightforwardly contradicted by his examples of dictators who violated the human
rights of others. Clearly, Adolf Hitler, Edi Amin, Kim Jong-il, and others guilty of violating human
rights did not believe that they were acting unjustly by denying their victims an opportunity to “live
a worthwhile life.” Hence, short of articulating adequate philosophical justifications for his claims,
Pojman leaves the POE ungrounded. Again, this is problematic because, in part, the POE grounds
his conception of human rights, which, in turn, grounds his conception of world government.
Pojman might attempt to sidestep my objections by arguing that Hobbes’s arguments for the state of
nature, human rights, and the establishment of the commonwealth provides enough philosophical
justification for grounding his world government. In this way, he could accept my objections but
nevertheless argue that, since he is a Hobbesian, his conception of world government is grounded
by Hobbes’s arguments for the state of nature, human rights, and the transfer of human rights for
the establishment of government. But, of course, such an attempt to sidestep my objections would
fail, particularly since I have already illustrated that there are serious philosophical and practical
problems inherent in Hobbes. To be sure, I have illustrated above that Hobbes’s arguments for his
conception of human rights is irreconcilably inconsistent;113 that since there are no shared human
rights practices in Hobbes’s state of nature through which humans transfer human rights and incur
duties his conception of the state of nature makes the transfer of human rights for the establishment
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of the commonwealth practically impossible;114 and that Hobbes’s argument for the transfer of
rights presupposes that shared human rights practices exist in the state of nature and therefore it is
straightforwardly inconsistent with his conception of the state of nature.115 These objections
preclude the possibility that Pojman could appeal to Hobbes’s arguments in order to find the
philosophical justifications necessary for grounding his conception of world government.
Unfortunately, at this juncture, it seems that Pojman is out of options for avoiding my objections.
First, I have illustrated that his arguments fail to ground his conception of world government
because his principles are ultimately unjustified. Secondly, I have illustrated that he cannot appeal
to Hobbes’s arguments for the state of nature, human rights, and the establishment of the
commonwealth as a way of providing grounding for his conception of world government because
Hobbes’s arguments are philosophically and practically problematic. Hence, Pojman’s endeavor to
ground a moderate conception of cosmopolitan world government ultimately fails.
VIII. The Final Analysis.
Pojman seems to notice that there are some problems with his arguments but he wrongly calculates
the strength of them. For example, in Terrorism, Human Rights, and the Case for World
Government, he writes: “these arguments need improvement and refinement, but they are
sufficiently substantive to provide” grounding and guidance for a moderate cosmopolitan world
government.116 For the reasons articulated above, I disagree with Pojman’s claim that his
arguments can provide grounding for his conception of a moderate cosmopolitan world government.
However, I think that, in outline, his book can serve as a guide for how to structure the relations
between a moderate cosmopolitan world government and existing nation-states. For example, I like
Pojman’s suggestion that we structure the relations between a moderate cosmopolitan world
government and existing nation-states in the way that the U.S. has structured its relations between
its federal government and the governments of its fifty states. I like this suggestion because it could
solve the problem of impunity while maintaining respect for the sovereignty of existing nation-
states. But, first, I would add the proviso that Pojman’s moderate cosmopolitan world government
also be complimentary. That is, it ought to have the power to intercede to prosecute accusations of
human rights violations only when the governments of nation-states are unwilling or unable to do
so. In this way, we could provide international law with the teeth it so desperately needs, give
nation-states the first opportunity to prosecute the human rights violations that occur within their
jurisdictions, thereby reserving intervention from the world government as a last option, and we
would maintain respect for the sovereignty of existing nation-states.
Nevertheless, such a world government would still require an adequate philosophical justification.
Otherwise, we would have no reason for changing existing international relations between nation-
states to relations that are unjustified. So, while Pojman’s proposal provides us with a good outline
for constructing the relations between a world government and the governments of existing nation-
states, it fails to provide adequate philosophical justifications for his conception of world
government. For this reason, I have rejected it.
Pojman might seek to develop a philosophically adequate justification for his conception of a
moderate cosmopolitan world government by first switching from a Hobbesian conception of
international relations to, say, a Lockean conception of international relations. This would allow
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him to avoid the objection that it is practically impossible for humans to transfer human rights for
the establishment of the commonwealth, or, in this case, a cosmopolitan world government. To be
sure, unlike Hobbes, Locke argued that there are shared social and cultural practices among people
in the state of nature, one of which is a share human rights practice. For example, Locke tells us
that the state of nature is governed by an obligatory law of reason and that the law grants all rational
human beings human rights to life, liberty, and property, and, correlatively, it obliges all rational
human beings to refrain from interfering with the life, liberty, and property of others.117 In this
way, on a Lockean model, humans have both negative and positive duties. In light of this, it is
possible for rational humans to transfer human rights for the establishment of the commonwealth in
Locke’s state of nature. To be sure, Locke straightforwardly tells us that bargains struck in the state
of nature are obligatory.118 More importantly, however, this would allow Pojman to avoid the
objection that it is practically impossible for humans to transfer human rights for the establishment
of a cosmopolitan world government.
Finally, in order to develop a philosophically adequate justification for his conception of a moderate
cosmopolitan world government, Pojman would also have to adequately justify his Principle of
Humanity (POH) and Principle of Equality (POE). He might, for example, attempt to justify the
POH by arguing that insofar as all humans require certain fundamental necessities in order to
continue their existence, i.e. food, water, shelter, and so on, consistency requires that they refrain
from interfering with the fundamental necessities of others. Otherwise, by consistency, others would
be able to interfere with their fundamental necessities, which, of course, no rational human would
accept. Hence, consistency with respect to interference with the necessities of human life, that is,
the Principle of Humanity, requires that each refrain from interfering with the fundamental
necessities of all.
Lastly, with regard to the Principle of Equality, he might attempt to argue that consistency requires
that we treat like, or sufficiently equal, entities alike, unless, of course, we have a sufficient reason
for doing otherwise. Hence, insofar as all humans require certain fundamental necessities in order to
continue their existence they are sufficiently equal. Therefore, consistency with respect to human
needs, that is, the Principle of Equality, requires that we treat all humans equally. From this,
Pojman might be able to generate a conception of human rights that could be used to ground his
conception of a moderate cosmopolitan world government. Of course, the only way to be certain
that this approach would work would be for Pojman, or someone following his lead, to sufficiently
develop and articulate those arguments. My analysis of both the potential and deficiencies inherent
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